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Abstract
This Article makes two central claims. One is that the two processes are related in important
ways and that neither can be fully understood without understanding the other. The other is that the
relationships between the two reveal changes in the dynamics of European competition law that
have so far been little noticed. This Article first sets out briefly the basic outlines of the procedural
modernization process, focusing on aspects of its dynamics that are particularly relevant to the
ties between it and the process of substantive modernization. It next depicts the process that I call
“substantive modernization,” identifying the dimensions and dynamics of that process and revealing a story that is often not clearly perceived. I then point to some of the ways in which the two
processes have been related to each other and analyze some of the implications of this relationship.
Finally, I use this analysis to draw some conclusions about the current state of competition law in
Europe.

TWO FORMS OF MODERNIZATION IN
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
Davidj Gerber*
INTRODUCTION
In European competition law, the term "modernization"
has been a catchword and focus of attention since the late 1990s.
Usually, the reference is to "procedural" or "institutional" modernization. The European Commission ("Commission") used
the term "modernization" when referring to the important set of
changes in the institutional structure and procedures of competition law that it introduced in 2004, and it called the new regulation and its accompanying materials its "modernization package."' This procedural modernization has fundamentally
changed the procedures for developing and applying competition law in Europe.
During the same period in which this form of modernization was proceeding, another form of "modernization" also took
shape. It represents a fundamental reorientation of much of the
thinking about substantive competition law in Europe. Given
that the term "modernization" was already occupied by the procedural program noted above, it is generally not used to refer to
these substantive law changes. Nevertheless, these changes have
also been fundamental and very much represent a program of
"modernization." They are often referred to as a new and more
"modern" form of competition law.2
Curiously, little attention has been paid to the relationship
between these two processes. Yet they have taken place over
* An earlier version of this Article was presented as a lecture at the University of
Exeter, England in May 2006. The author wishes to thank Professors Stephen Wilks,
John Usher, and other colleagues at the University of Exeter for their helpful comments on that lecture. He would also like to thank Emily Grande for valuable research
assistance.
1. See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMPETITION,
MODERNISATION OF EC ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT RULES: COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
1/2003 AND THE MODERNISATION PACKAGE (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
[hereinafter
comm/competition/publications/publications/modernisation-en.pdf
MODERNISATION PACKAGE].

2. See, e.g., Commission Press Release, SPEECH/00/240 (June 26, 2000) ("The
Commission is .. . in the process of modernising and rationalising much of the Com-

munity's substantive legislation in the competition field.").
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roughly the same period, many of the same people have been
involved in instigating the changes, and they have been driven
by many of the same forces and pressures. Understanding the
relationship between these two processes promises not only to
provide a better understanding of each, but also important insights into the current roles of competition law in the further
integration of Europe. Even more broadly, it helps to reveal the
forces at work in this critical period of European legal and political development.
This Article makes two central claims. One is that the two
processes are related in important ways and that neither can be
fully understood without understanding the other. The other is
that the relationships between the two reveal changes in the dynamics of European competition law that have so far been little
noticed.
This Article first sets out briefly the basic outlines of the procedural modernization process, focusing on aspects of its dynamics that are particularly relevant to the ties between it and the
process of substantive modernization. It next depicts the process
that I call "substantive modernization," identifying the dimensions and dynamics of that process and revealing a story that is
often not clearly perceived. I then point to some of the ways in
which the two processes have been related to each other and
analyze some of the implications of this relationship. Finally, I
use this analysis to draw some conclusions about the current
state of competition law in Europe.

I. PROCEDURAL MODERNIZATION
A. Initial Phases
Many aspects of procedural modernization have been well
described, and thus we need not go into detail about the basic
contents of the modernization package.' Nevertheless, it is necessary to review some basics of the process in order to recognize
3. For further discussion of the basic contents of the Modernization Package, see
David J. Gerber & Paolo Cassinis, The Modernisation of European Community Competition
Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement Part I, 27 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 10 (2006);
The Modernisation of EuropeanCommunity Competition Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement Part II, 27 EUtR. COMPETITION L. REv. 51 (2006). For background, see David J.
Gerber, ModernisingEuropean Competition Law: A Developmental Perspective, 22 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 122 (2001).
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its relationships to the substantive modernization process that
accompanied it.
The seeds of modernization were sown in the 1990s by the
fall of the Soviet Union. With that event, perceptive officials in
the European Commission realized that the new independence
of eastern European states was likely to lead to major changes in
the process of European integration. It became clear that many
of these States were likely to become members of the European
Union ("EU"). Given that membership was already being expanded by the addition of new members in 1995, 4 this would
represent a significant expansion in the workload of many director generals ("DGs"), including the competition directorate.
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, then director general of the Directorate-General for Competition ("DG Comp"), recognized that the
existing procedural mechanism for the application of competition law was likely to be seriously challenged by this impending
expansion. 5 Accordingly, DG Comp began a search for ways to
respond to these changes. A central concern was that the competition DG would not be able to effectively deal with a significantly expanded workload. He responded by encouraging decentralization of administrative authority to the EU Member
States and private competition litigation.6 In addition to this basic idea, the Commission sought to improve informational and
other forms of cooperation between the Member State authorities and the Commission, thus increasing the capacity of Member State authorities to take additional responsibility for competition enforcement.
These measures met with limited success. In particular, the
admonition to increase private enforcement had little effect,
presumably because the procedural mechanism provided little
incentive for such suits. Any suit based on Article 81 of the

4. See Europa, History of the European Union, http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
5. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Implementation of EC Competition Law by National
Anti-Trust Authorities, 17 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 88, 89 (1996) (arguing that the
Commission alone would be unable to effectively enforce competition law in the larger
European Union ("EU")).
6. See id. ("Two conditions must be fulfilled to allow enforcement of Community
competition laws by national authorities: Member States must enact the appropriate
legislation ... and Member States must establish their own anti-trust authorities .... ").
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Treaty Establishing the European Community7 ("EC Treaty")
centers on the exemption provisions in paragraph 3, and under
European Council Regulation 17, only the Commission was authorized to grant such exemptions.8 As a result, there was little
incentive to incur the expenses of private litigation. Moreover,
this was generally perceived as a function that state agencies
should perform.9
With the expansion of EU membership to fifteen in 1995
and the growing realization that there were likely soon to be ten
or more new Member States, the perceived need to respond to
these changes increased. As it became clearer that change was
likely, those who wanted to introduce changes in the system saw
opportunities to influence such changes, and this fueled criticisms of the existing system. In effect, the impending expansion
opened opportunities and encouraged those who wanted
changes to express them, because change was now anticipated.
For many, the only question was how far the changes would go
and in which directions.
As we view this process of modernization, however, it is important to recall that at the time criticism of competition law
procedures was limited. Member State authorities typically had
few complaints. The Commission operated within its sphere, seldom causing problems for Member State authorities. There
were complaints that the Commission was becoming too powerful and that the most important decisions were moving from the
Member States to Brussels, but outside Germany this was of little
concern to most Member State authorities. I ° In business and legal circles, there were occasional complaints about the uncertainty and complexity of Commission procedures, but they had
relatively little salience prior to the early 1990s. aa
7. Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community art.
81, O.J. C 224/1, at 37 (1992).
8. See Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13 J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 195962, at 87.
9. See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 429 (1998) (explaining that bureaucrats almost exclusively
enforce competition law in the European system).
10. See id. at 381 (noting the perception that important aspects of competition law
were increasingly handled by the Commission in Brussels instead of by national competition authorities).
11. See Ehlermann, supra note 5, at 90 ("In retrospect, it is astonishing that the
debate about a better use of national competition administrations did not begin before
the early 1990s.").
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As the potential effect of impending change was recognized, however, criticisms emerged along several fronts. One
was the notification requirement for contracts that might violate
Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 12 These notifications were originally
designed to give the Commission information about cartels and
to provide legal certainty to businesses. With the expansion of
the Community, this system had become a major burden on the
staff of the competition directorate. Moreover, it was not clear
that it provided value sufficient to justify this burden.
A second main issue was the Commission's monopoly on exemptions under Article 81(3).13 It had been a fundamental of
competition law thinking that this exclusivity was necessary to
provide coherence in the application of the law in this area.
Given that these exemptions are very broadly worded, there was
fear that if exemptions could be granted by other institutions,
they might be granted inconsistently and perhaps in ways that
favored domestic interests.
The growing complexity and formalism of the existing system presented a third set of issues. As the Community expanded
during the 1970s and 1980s and the number of transactions subject to notification requirements increased significantly, it had
become necessary to develop a set of procedural mechanisms for
controlling the workload of the Commission and avoiding extensive delays. Thus the Commission introduced block exemptions,
so-called "negative clearances," and other procedural devices
that sought predictability by establishing formal criteria for assessing whether an agreement violated Article 81.14 This led to
an increasingly complicated procedural mechanism.
Pressure for change came from several sources. Large European business firms and their legal advisors voiced particular
12. See Gerber, ModernisingEuropean Competition Law, supra note 3, at 122-23.
13. See Jfirgen Basedow, The Modernization of European Competition Law: A Stoy of
Unfinished Concepts, 42 TEx INT'L L.J. 429, 430 (2007) (noting some of the problems that
arose as a result of the Commission's monopoly on granting exemptions).
14. See Mario Siragusa, Rethinking Article 85: Problems and Challenges in the Design
and Enforcement of the EC Competition Rules, in 1997 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INsT. 271, 281-82
(Barry Hawk ed., 1998) (discussing the Commission's introduction of block exemptions
for specified classes of agreements and how their terms are often rigid and limited in
scope); see also Frank Montag, The Case for a Reform of Regulation 17/62: Problems and
Possible Solutions from a Practitioner'sPoint of View, in 1998 FORDHAM Corn'. L. INST. 157,
163-65 (Barry Hawk ed., 1999) (discussing block exemption procedures and the different types of notifications required by the procedures).
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concerns about the costs and uncertainties of Commission procedures. Representatives of this group complained, for example, about the need to notify agreements, claiming that this imposed undue compliance costs and served little purpose. They
also pushed for a streamlining of Commission procedures, particularly those regarding mergers.1 5
There was also significant pressure for change from outside
Europe. One source was U.S. government officials, especially
from the U.S. Department of Justice, who showed much interest
in this process and complained that Commission procedures
were unwieldy, costly and potentially discriminatory toward nonEU (i.e., U.S.) firms.1 6 A second form of outside pressure began
to emerge that was specifically "transnational." It came from
what I will dub the transatlantic competition law group ("TCL
Group"). This rather loose group includes competition lawyers
heavily involved in EU competition law and mainly from large
international law firms, top competition law officials from the
United States and Europe, and occasionally a few academics.1 7
The group began to take shape and develop continuity from
about the time that the two modernization processes startedi.e., in the mid-1990s. One factor in its formation was the increasing frequency and intensity of contacts among members of
the group, including a dramatic increase in the number and perceived importance of international conferences on international
competition law issues. Another was the rapidly growing importance of transnational cooperation in competition law enforcement. A small number of these competition law experts became
15. See, e.g., Siragusa, supra note 14, at 284 (proposing a "Rule of Reason Approach" to assess agreements in European competition law in conjunction with various
procedural improvements); see also Montag, supra note 14, at 173 (discussing the need
for a timetable as part of the notification procedure).
16. See William J. Kolasky, Dep. Asst. Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Address before the Council for the U.S. and Italy Bi-Annual Conference: U.S. and
EU Competition Policy: Cartels, Mergers and Beyond (Jan. 25, 2002), availableat http:/
/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9848.pdf (pointing out at least five key issues in
the 2001 General Electric ("GE")/Honeywell merger case where the U.S. and the EU
came to opposite conclusions).
17. See, e.g., Christopher Bright, DeregulationofEC Competition Policy: Rethinking Article 85(1), in 1994 FoRDHAM CoRP. L. INsT. 505, 524-27 (Barry Hawk ed., 1995) (criticiz-

ing the scope of Article 85(1) as exorbitant); Patrick Massey, Reform of EC Competition
Law: Substance, Procedure and Institutions, in 1996 FoRDHAM CoRP. L. INsT. 91 (Barry
Hawk ed., 1997) (arguing that it is necessary to reevaluate EU competition law in light
of various developments regarding national competition laws within EU Member
States).
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"regulars" at the most influential conferences-such as the Fordham International Antitrust Law and Policy Conference and the
European University Institute ("EUI") competition law conference in Florence. This group does not represent an "interest
group" in the traditional sense, and its "membership" is not
fixed or formalized. Nevertheless, the regularity of contact
among members of the group, a growing coalescence of views on
relevant issues, and a perception of shared interests began to
give the group identifiable contours in the mid-1990s, and this
process has continued since then. Meetings of this group have
provided the main international forum for modernization and a
source of impetus and support for that process."'
B. Creating the Modernization Package
In response to these concerns and pressures, the competition directorate began an internal review of its procedures.1 9
The discussions were kept highly secret for more than a year,
and there was apparently significant opposition to major change
from high-ranking officials within the Commission. 20 This process eventually led to a degree of consensus within DG Comp,
and in April, 1999, the Commission released a White Paper on
procedural modernization.2 1 On the basis of discussions of this
White Paper, the Commission released a proposed regulation in
September 2000.22 The final regulation, Regulation 1/2003, was
passed on December 16, 2002, and took effect on May 1, 2004.23
18. For a discussion of the growing importance of such groups in international
legal development, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEw WORLD ORDER (2004).

19. See Karel Van Miert, Comm'r, European Directorate-General for Competition,
Presentation of the 25th Report on Competition Policy to the European Parliament
(May 30, 1996), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/
sp1996- 044 en.html.
20. See Alexander Schaub, EC Competition System: ProposalsJ
for Reform, in 1998 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 129, 148 (Barry Hawk ed., 1999) ("In the field of Articles 85 and 86,
it is of particular urgency to look at the division of enforcement competences and at a
possible reform of the procedural framework laid down in Regulation 17. For perhaps
too long a time, this was taboo for the Commission.").
21. Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Modernisation of
the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, COM (99) 027 Final (Apr.
1999).
22. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation
on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty and Amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC)
No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87, COM (2000) 582 Final (Sept. 2000).
23. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1 (2002).
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The plans for modernization required approval by the
Council, and thus the Commission had to convince the Member
States to support its proposals. The process of actually working
out this agreement lasted almost two years. It was a closed and
tightly controlled process, and the Commission put significant
effort and resources into managing the process, with weekly
meetings in Brussels at which specific topics were presented by
the Commission and discussed by the representatives of the
Member States. It is important to note that the Member States
typically did not send members of the State's competition authority to be their main representatives, but rather officials from
ministries such as commerce and finance. This is important, because these officials often knew little about competition law issues and had little incentive to take a serious interest in the outcomes, except insofar as they were directed to do so by their
home offices. While competition law officials often accompanied the official representatives, they did not control the vote of
their States.
This long deliberative process represented a clear "success"
for the Commission. The Commission achieved its primary
goals. It eliminated the notification requirement for contracts
under Article 81, and it eliminated its monopoly over exemptions under Article 83 of the EC Treaty.2 4 It established the idea
that Member States would be primarily responsible for application of competition law and that the European Commission
would only take enforcement action under limited circumstances. 2' The relationships among Member States would be
structured in the form of a network of officials in which the European Commission acted as the dominant voice and the control
organ.2 6
In one important respect, these meetings yielded more than
the Commission originally anticipated. During the formal process of creating the modernization package, the Commission decided that it would be desirable (in its terms, "necessary") to require that EU competition law be applied to all conduct that had
a European dimension. 27 This was a fundamental change in the
24. See id. art. 3, OJ. L 1/1, at 1 (2002).
25. See id.
26. See id. art. 15, O.J. L 1/1, at 4 (2002).
27. See MODERNISATION PACKAGE, supra note 1, at 10.
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existing system and radically strengthened the position and role
of the Commission, but it occurred within the confines of the
formal meeting process and under circumstances over which the
Commission had significant control.28 Among specialists in the
area, the debates about this issue were generally known. In particular, German representatives are reported to have opposed
the idea. After all, they had an important and well-developed
competition law system that would lose much of its role and importance. 29 While mild resistance was reported from others,
most Member States did not see this as particularly important
and accepted the new centrality of EU law in this area. Henceforth competition authorities throughout Europe would generally apply EU law in all cases except where the conduct and its
effects were basically limited to one Member State.
C. Dynamics
This modernization process developed its own dynamics,
and recognizing these dynamics provides a key to understanding
the relationship between substantive and procedural modernization. There have been two basic readings of modernization.
One focused on the dispersion of power and authority to Member States. Here the focus was often on the authority itself and
the legal framework for relations within the network.3" A second
interpretation criticized the first on the grounds that it was too
formalistic and that in practice the Commission actually augmented its power. 31 The two focused on different issues. I sug28. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 8, OJ. L 1/1, at 2 (2002). Article 8
provides that national competition authorities must apply EU law (Articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty")) to activities "which
may affect trade between the Member States." Id. The regulation prohibits national
competition authorities from applying national laws that conflict with Articles 81 and 82
of the EC Treaty, yet allows national authorities to apply "stricter" national laws that
apply to unilateral conduct. See id.
29. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, German Legal Culture and the Globalization of Competition Law: A HistoricalPerspective on the Expansion ofPrivateAntitrust Enforcement, 23 BERKxELEYJ. INT'L L. 474, 489 (2005) ("German competition agencies, and many commentators, initially responded with strong criticism of the change in enforcement philosophy
reflected in the Regulation.").
30. See, e.g., Ian Forrester, Modernization of EC Competition Law, 23 FORDHAM INT'L
LJ. 1028 (2000)
31. See, e.g., Alan Riley, EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely Thank You! Part One: Regulation 1 and the Notification Burden, 11 EUR. COMPETrrION L.
Rv. 604 (2003); Stephen Wilks, Agency Escape: Decentralizationor Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?, 18 GOVERNANCE 431 (2005).
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gest a third reading that recognizes both aspects of the process
and analyzes the relationship between them. The process was
both a decentralization of authority and an effort by the Com2
mission to control the future development of competition law.1
The Commission controlled the process. It moved the proposals forward, managing the meetings and controlling the
agenda. It framed the discussions as responses to its proposals.
Not surprisingly, it was often pursuing what it understood to be
its own interests in this process. This is not to say that the responsible officials viewed the Commission's interests as separate
from the public good or from its public responsibilities. The officials undoubtedly considered the two to be basically identical.
They were pursuing what they considered the best course, but
that course was also consistent with perceived interests of DG
Comp.
It quickly became clear that the Commission's role in
orchestrating the process put it in a position to achieve support
for its proposals from most Member States. Given that the Commission was controlling the procedure and the rules of engagement for discussions, it determined when delegations were given
information about issues to be discussed and decisions to be
made. Commission officials chaired the meetings and thus controlled the agenda, determined who would speak, and how issues
were to be framed. A Member State that might be inclined to
disagree with a Commission proposal could certainly be heard,
but the costs of opposition might be high, and the governments
of most Member States did not have sufficient interest in the
issues to incur such costs.
In general, it appears that Member State governments typically had limited interest in the reforms. The Commission emphasized its portrait of the modernization process as a devolution of authority to the states, and this was generally attractive to
at least most governments. It seemed to give Member State governments additional freedom from "Brussels" at a time when the
principle of subsidiarity was a central and popular political
theme. It also accorded Member State decision makers increased status. Such factors generally militated against major ef32. For an insightful discussion of the dynamics of the Commission in similar contexts, see John Usher, The Commission and the Law, in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 103
(David Spence ed., 2006).
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forts to block or question the Commission's agenda. As a consequence, Member States generally played a relatively passive role
in the process of agreeing on the modernization package.
The major exception to this general claim about the relative
lack of aggressive interest by Member State representatives was
Germany. German competition officials are known to have opposed some of the main points in the process.3 3 For example,
they resisted the abolition of the notification requirement as well
as the requirement that European law be applied to all conduct
with a transnational dimension. 3 4 Germany's interests differed
from those of most other States. The German Federal Cartel
Office ("FCO") was the first well-developed competition authority in Europe, and it had long been the most important competition authority in Europe." For the FCO, the changes represented a loss of power and influence. Moreover, Germany had a
highly influential corps of professors in the competition law
area, and this group generally urged resistance to the changes,
primarily on the ground that they would increase uncertainty
and undermine the effectiveness of competition law. 6 They
brought significant pressure on the German government to resist many of the key changes proposed by the Commission.
Finally, an important part of the dynamics of procedural
modernization has been the emergence and consolidation of
the TCL Group. That process has facilitated the development
and consolidation of relationships within this group. It provided
a specific institutional context that brought members of the
group together on a regular basis. Moreover, the discussions
were in reference to a defined set of goals, and they made obvious to the participants that there was a large set of issues in
which the interests of the Commission, large transnational law
firms, and the representatives of certain Member States such as
the United Kingdom could be aligned.
II. SUBSTANTIVE MODERNIZATION
The substantive modernization process is less defined than
33. See ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAw 1032-33 (2001); Bux-

baum, supra note 29, at 475.
34. See, e.g., JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 33, at 1032-33.
35. See id. at 1032-33; Buxbaum, supra note 29, at 482.
36. See Buxbaum, supra note 29, at 489.
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its procedural counterpart, and thus it is important to identify
what I mean by the term. In this Article, I use the term "substantive modernization" to refer to the project in which the Commission has changed the basic means by which competition law's
conduct norms are given content and thus changed the substantive law itself. This process covers roughly the same time period
as does the procedural modernization process, but it has not
been formally organized as a "modernization" project. As a result, it is less easily perceived as a distinct process. It had neither
a fixed point of departure nor a predetermined plan, but rather
it has taken shape over time, as those in favor of substantive
change have recognized opportunities and added objectives to
their agenda.
As with procedural modernization, it is necessary to recall
that in the years immediately before the process commencedi.e., the mid-90s-there had been relatively little criticism of the
existing substantive law. In general, officials of the competition
directorate seemed confident that a workable and effective body
of principles and methods had been developed.3" There was little questioning of the goals of competition law, and there was
frequent praise for the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") and
the Commission for the way in which they developed the role of
competition law to support and enhance economic integration
in Europe. This does not mean that everyone was satisfied.
There were complaints about the lack of predictability in the
methods that the Commission and the courts used in determining and applying the substantive competition law norms,38 but
there had been few calls for basic changes in the substantive law.
There was a general sense that the substantive law that had been
developed by the ECJ and the Commission was an appropriate
and effective legal framework for European conditions. 39
37. See Karel Van Miert, Comm'r, European Directorate-General for Competition,
Address at BASF Headquarters: The Future of Competition Policy (Nov. 18, 1997),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1997 064_en.
html ("[T]he question that we in the Commission have to answer is, 'to what extent
should a policy that has been so successful in the past be changed?'").
38. See Siragusa, supra note 14, at 279-84; see also Alberto Pera & Mario Todino,
Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: Need for a Reform?, in 1996 FoatrHAm Cornu. L. INs-r.
125, 140-42 (Barry Hawk ed., 1997).
39. See Forrester, supra note 30, at 1036-37 (describing European competition
law's success and noting that many were content with the system and did not want to
risk the uncertainty that could result from giving more power to national authorities
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A. Defining the Process: Towards a "MoreEconomic Approach"
The substantive modernization process includes two components, though they are often not clearly distinguished. One involves a significant narrowing of the goals of competition law. In
place of the set of goals developed over time in European case
law that sought to protect the process of competition as well as
to foster economic integration in Europe, the new conception of
competition law posits one central goal- "consumer welfare" as
understood by neoclassical economics.4 ° The second component of substantive modernization follows from this narrower
conception of competition law's goals. It posits that neo-classical
economics provides not only the goals of competition law, but
also its standards and methods. Taken together, these two intellectual developments have moved the language, methods, and
perspectives of neoclassical economics to a central position
within European competition law and made formal economic
methodology the central organizing structure for thinking about
competition law and the central means for defining the goals
and methods of competition law. This package has come to be
referred to in Europe as the "more economic approach."
The significance of this change is somewhat masked by the
term "more economic approach." That term suggests that the
changes are limited and involve only a gradual change of emphasis. It implies that there is merely an increased use of a support tool that has been employed in the past. At one level, this is
accurate. Economic reasoning has been used throughout the
development of competition law in Europe, and the changes do
increase its use. The "more economic approach" is, however, far
more than this gradualist image suggests. Economics has long
been used on an ad hoc basis to analyze fact situations and to
make predictions about the consequences of particular conduct
(e.g. mergers) and thereby aid the process of norm-application.
The assumption embodied in the "more economic approach
movement" is, however, that neo-classical economics itself provides the norms and goals for European competition law and
that it also furnishes the principal methods for applying those
and courts); see also Barry Hawk, EU "Modernisation:A Latter-day Reformation, GLOBAL
CoMp. REv., Aug./Sept. 1999, at 12, 12.
40. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 8189 (1978) (examining the intellectual background of the "consumer welfare" goal).
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norms. It is this more fundamental and far-reaching aspect of
the use of economics that represents the core of the "more economic approach."4
B. Impetus for Change
Calls for a more American-style approach to competition
law in Europe began to penetrate the academic literature in the
1980s. The law and economics revolution in antitrust law in the
United States had shown its force, and a few European writers
found its ideas attractive. Professor Valentine Korah of University College, London, was particularly prominent, as she argued
for increased use of economics along the lines that were becoming orthodox in the United States.4" For years, however, such
arguments gained limited support.
Yet in the mid-1990s these arguments began to be viewed
more favorably. The so-called "Chicago school arguments" that
had dramatically changed U.S. antitrust law in the 1980s now
began to fall on receptive ears. 4" Some within the Commission
also began to take them seriously. In particular, attacks from
this analytical perspective on the legal treatment of vertical restraints in Europe began to find favor. Articles criticizing the
Commission's approach to vertical restraints were discussed ever
more widely, and an article on the subject by Barry Hawk that
appeared in 1996 became a focus of attention.4 4 Hawk had been
a Professor in the United States, but at the time he was a partner
in a large U.S. law firm as well as the organizer of the Fordham
Corporate Law Institute's annual competition law conference.
He argued openly for importing the U.S. approach to these is41. See David J. Gerber, The Future of Article 82: Dissecting the Conflict, in 2007 EUR.
COMPETITION L. ANNUAL (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann ed., forthcoming 2008).
42. See Valentine Korah, From Legal Form Toward Economic Efficiency-Article 85(1) of
the EEC Treaty in Contrast to U.S. Antitrust, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 1009 (1990).
43. See Karel Van Miert, Comm'r, European Directorate-General for Competition,
Address to Danish Competition Council: The Role of Competition Policy in Modern
Economics (Nov. 10, 1997), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
speeches/text/sp1997 061_en.html.
There are those who criticise much of our current practice and approach.
And whilst I believe that the Commission has negotiated its way very successfully through the many conflicting pressures on it over the years, I do accept
that some criticisms are valid. We need to address ourselves to them.

Id.
44. See generally Barry Hawk, System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition
Law, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 973 (1995).
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sues into European competition law.45 For him and others, a
form-based approach to vertical agreements was inappropriate
because the effects of such agreements depended on specific circumstances. What was necessary, they argued, was an effectsbased approach in which there were no, or few, legal conclusions to be drawn from the form of an agreement. Legal conclusions could only be drawn when the factual circumstances had
been analyzed from an economist's perspective.
Several factors contributed to this new willingness of the
Commission to respond positively to arguments that it had previously not taken very seriously. Many of these factors emanated
from the same sources that were also promoting procedural
modernization. One was the formation and development of the
TCL Group mentioned above.4 6 EU and U.S. officials were now
meeting together frequently, often attending the same conferences that also featured large-firm lawyers from the United
States and Europe. For example, although the annual competition law conferences of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute
had started in 1974, the dramatic increase in the role and importance of competition law on a global scale during the 1990s significantly increased attendance at these meetings and increased
their prestige. This, in turn, encouraged additional meetings,
most notably the annual seminar at the European University in
Florence organized by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, former director
general of DG Comp. As such meetings increased in scope and
importance and became more frequent, the participants increasingly came to form a recognizable group with reasonably welldefined boundaries and a shared discourse. These meetings
provide a forum in which members of the group become well
acquainted with top Commission officials. The meetings serve
many very valuable purposes, and they also have provided opportunities for U.S. antitrust officials and practitioners to criticize
the Commission and to put pressure on it.
As the TCL Group took shape and as the law firms represented in the group grew rapidly in size and resources, the pressures on the Commission also grew. This led the Commission to
seek a more readily defensible basis for its decision making prac45. See id. at 973.
46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the definition and formation of the transnational competition law group ("TCL Group")).
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tice. A more economic approach, at least in the context of vertical restraints, seemed to promise a more specific reference point
for decisions, one that would be both more intellectually sound
and more predictable.
Another factor was the relative economic performance record of the United States compared to Europe in the 1990s." v
This was a decade of dramatic economic growth in the United
States, but European economic performance lagged behind.
For many in European business, this led to a call for reduced
interference from the Commission in business activities, specifically in the area of competition law enforcement.4 8 The law and
economics revolution in U.S. antitrust law had significantly reduced the enforcement of the antitrust laws in virtually all areas
other than cartels, and business leaders argued that a similar
evolution in European competition law was necessary for Europe
to compete with the United States in terms of economic development.

49

Finally, there were private interests at play. For economists,
management consultancy firms and big-firm lawyers from the
United States there were significant incentives to favor the increased centrality of economics. It promised both groups opportunities to "sell" their skills and knowledge to a vast new market.
C. Shape of the Process
The shape of the substantive modernization process differed significantly from the contours of procedural modernization. It was a slow process that took shape over time, as participants observed the progress of procedural modernization and
recognized opportunities for change. The initial step involved
revisions in one specific, but major area-the law relating to vertical restraints. Relying primarily on the new learning that had
marched through U.S. antitrust law on this subject, and responding to criticisms noted above, the Commission proposed new
47. See UNION OF INDUS. AND EMPLOYERS' CONFEDERATION OF EUROPE [UNICE], EuBARCELONA MUST REVITALISE THE LISBON PROCESS 2 (2002) ("If
the EU had achieved the same rate of growth as the US over the last 10 years, its total
GDP would have been roughly 17% higher in 2001 than it actually was.") [hereinafter
UNICE REPORT].
48. See, e.g., id. at 2-3.
49. See Korah, supra note 42, at 1009; see also Hawk, supra note 44, at 973.
ROPEAN BUSINESS SAYS:
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guidelines on vertical restraints law in 1997.50 They introduced
the proposition that the legality of this type of agreement would
no longer be determined primarily by reference to the particular
form of the agreement, but could only be determined by reference to its effects under the specific circumstances in which it
was used. These effects would be determined by factors such as
the characteristics of the market, the relationships among the
contracting parties, and their market power. After intensive
public discussion of these issues, the guidelines were enacted
and presented as a major change in Community competition
5
policy. '
Once this basic proposition had been successfully implemented in the area of vertical restraints, there was increasing
pressure to use it in other areas of competition law. In 2001, the
Commission enacted similar guidelines relating to horizontal
agreements.5 2 These guidelines reflected the Commission's new
position that "consumer welfare" as understood by neoclassical
economics would be the primary standard for applying Article
81. The variety of issues that had been taken into account under
the exemption provisions in paragraph 3 of that Article were
now brought within one analytical framework. This standard
was also the basis for a revision to the merger regulations that
the Commission enacted in 2002.2
With the completion of these changes, the law relating to
unilateral conduct (abuse of a dominant position) was the only
major area in which the reach of the new approach was as yet
unclear. In 2005, the Commission's competition directorate is50. See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy (Jan. 22, 1997), available at http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green-papers/pdf/com96_721_en.pdf; see also Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) Amending Regulation No
19/65/EEC on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of
Agreements and Concerted Practices and Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC)
Amending Regulation No. 17: First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty, COM (98) 546 Final (Sept. 1998).
51. See Commission Regulation No. 2790/99, O.J. L 336/21 (1999); Commission
Notice, O.J. L 291/1 (2000) (Guidelines on Vertical Restraints).
52. See Commission Notice, O.J. L 3/02 (2001) (Guidelines on the Applicability of
Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements).
53. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Notice on Appraisal of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (Dec. 2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/mergers/review/final-draft_en.pdf.
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sued a working paper that sought full application of that approach here as well. 4 This final step has met with greater resistance than the others, and it is still being hotly debated in Europe. 5
D. Dynamics of Process
The Commission has played the central role in substantive
modernization, as it did in procedural modernization, but its
role there differs significantly from its role in modernizing procedures. In contrast to the procedural context, the Commission
has not needed formal political decisions by the Council to
achieve the changes that it has made so far (changing Article 82
of the EC Treaty is more complicated). Here it has been in a
position to make changes on its own, simply announcing
changes in the analytical framework it is applying to cases and
then applying that analysis in actual cases.
For the Commission, the process of change acquired a momentum of its own that has pushed it to continue and expand
the process. Once the argument is accepted that the goal of
competition law should be defined by neoclassical economics,
there is a strong incentive to apply that logic and that approach
throughout competition law. As we have seen, the Commission
started with vertical restraints, but this led, perhaps inexorably,
to the application of the same analysis into other areas of competition law.
Another source of momentum in the process has been the
deepening perception that previous methods for determining
and applying competition law might actually impede rather than
foster economic development in Europe. The magnitude of this
change in the perceived value of competition law is critical to
understanding the modernization process. From its inception,
54. See European Commission, DG Competition, DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses (Dec. 19,
2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf.
55. See Ulf Boge et al., Monopolization Versus Abuse of a Dominant Position, in 2003
FoR HAm CoP. L. INST. 341 (Barry Hawk ed., 2004); Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization,
Abuse ofDominance,and the Indeterminacy of Economics: The U.S./E.U. Divide, 2006 UTAH L.
REv. 725, 729 (2006);John Vickers, Paper for the Eighth Annual EU Competition Law
and Policy Workshop at the European University Institute: How Does the Prohibition
of Dominance Fit with the Rest of Competition Policy? (Jun. 6, 2003), availableat http:/
/oft.gov.uk/shared oft/speeches/spe03O3.pdf.
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competition law was generally viewed as a means of improving
the competitiveness of European industry.5 6 It was seen as a tool
by which obstacles to competition could be eliminated, thereby
improving the efficiency of European markets, benefiting consumers and improving the performance of European firms. This
improved performance was assumed to better prepare European
companies for competition outside of Europe.
During the course of the 1990s, however, two sets of factors
altered this perception for a significant group of officials and
lawyers. One was a perspective on competition law that had
been developed among writers in the U.S. law and economics
movement. From this perspective, competition law, indeed any
form of government activity, is just a form of regulation and, as
such, it necessarily represents an interference with the free functioning of the economy and, ipso facto, a detriment to economic
efficiency.5 A second set of factors involved external circumstances. As the U.S. economy grew rapidly in the 1990s and European economies struggled, Europeans worried increasingly
that they had to change the way things were done in order to
keep pace with developments in the United States. This led to
measures designed to foster the competitiveness of European industry, including, for example, the so-called "Lisbon Program"
enunciated by the Commission in 2000. Under these circumstances, a competition law that was perceived as stricter than U.S.
antitrust law seemed to be an obstacle.5"
The impending expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe
increased the impact of both of these factors. Since many of the
new entrants had long had economies in which the competition
process was marginalized, there was much concern in Brussels
that a competition law that was not firmly grounded in economic
methodology could be used by national officials and courts in
these States for purposes other than the protection and development of competition. In this context, the "more economic ap56. See GERBER, supra note 9, at 420 (providing historical background of competition law in Europe).
57. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 23-25
(1984) (elaborating on the perspective that competition law interferes with economic
efficiency).
58. See UNICE REPORT, supra note 47, at 2 (noting that EU growth lags behind that
of the United States and calls for more free and open markets to stimulate investment
and growth).
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proach" promised a means not only of unifying competition law
analysis throughout an expanded Europe, but also of more easily
identifying non-competition-oriented divergences among national competition regimes.
Several prominent conflicts between EU and U.S. competition authorities also encouraged DG Comp leaders to adopt a
posture for competition law analysis that would be more in line
with U.S. law. In particular, the highly publicized conflict over
the proposed merger between General Electric ("GE") and Honeywell led to pressure on the Commission to move toward this
kind of convergence. 59 In that case, U.S. antitrust authorities approved a merger between two U.S. companies that would have
been possibly the largest single merger in history, but the Commission prohibited the merger, with the result that it was abandoned. This infuriated important groups in the United States
and led to strong criticism by lawyers, business groups and U.S.
government officials.
EU institutions also contributed to the pressure for change.
In particular, a set of three merger decisions by the Court of
First Instance in 2002 forced the Commission to reconsider its
methodology.6 ° In those cases, the Court rebuked the Commission for failing to substantiate its analysis of the probable effects
of proposed mergers. While the Court did not directly mandate
a more economic approach, it put the Commission under pres61
sure in ways that it had not previously experienced.
Throughout this process of substantive modernization, the
TCL Group has gradually become better defined, and its members have become more closely linked by common interests.
The potential benefits of coordinating the two most important
59. See David J. Gerber, The European Commission's GE/Honeywell Decision: U.S. Responses and Their Implications, ZEITSCH iUr FUR WErrBEWERBSRECHT, Jan.-Mar. 2003, at 87.
60. See Airtours Plc. v. Commission, Case T-342/99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2585,
294
(holding that the Commission made errors in assessing fundamental factors and, therefore, failed to prove that the merger of two tour operators would impede effective competition); Schneider Electric SA v. Commission, Case T-310/01, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4071,
288 (finding that the Commission's analysis overstated the market shares of the
merged companies); Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, Case T-5/02, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4381,
1 337-38 (annulling the Commission's decision because the Court found lack of horizontal, vertical and conglomerate anti-competitive effects).
61. See David J. Gerber, Courts as Economic Experts in European Merger Law, in 2003
FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST. 475, 480-83 (Barry Hawk ed., 2004) (explaining that the Court
employed its own economic expertise to find that the Commission's economic analysis
was inadequate).
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competition law systems have provided an impetus for increased
cooperation. In addition to the shared interest in a more effective and efficient competition law regime for the United States
and Europe, substantive modernization has also benefited individual members of this group. For example, American lawyers
and competition law officials benefit because the convergence is
based on the U.S. model. The EU has essentially moved toward
an approach that is already the basis for U.S. substantive antitrust law. As noted above, this enhances the value of the expertise of U.S. attorneys and thus tends not only to promote their
influence in the area, but also to increase the market value of
their services. For economists, the incentives are direct and significant. It greatly increases their role in competition law and
with this the value of their expertise.
III. EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORMS
OF MODERNIZATION
These two modernization processes are related in important
ways. Each conditions the other. Each has derived benefits from
the progress and impact of the other, and each has been shaped
by the other. While the impact of procedural modernization on
its substantive analogue has often been more direct, the role of
substantive change in supporting procedural modernization has
been no less important. Above all, the mutual interdependence
of the two processes is critical to understanding each.
Some basic facts suggest the dimensions of the relationship.
The two processes started at approximately the same time-in
the mid-1990s, with procedural modernization taking a defined
shape a few years earlier than substantive modernization. They
continued over roughly the same period, reaching their most intense phases at about the same time in the years bracketing
2000. Procedural modernization developed somewhat faster
than its substantive analogue. The individuals and groups that
have driven and shaped the two processes have also often been
the same or overlapping. These basic facts suggest likely interdependence, and they point to some of the connections between
the two processes.
Each modernization process both fostered the proposition
that change was positive and benefited from acceptance of that
proposition. As each proceeded, it reinforced the image that

1256

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 31:1235

fundamental change was not only positive, but also necessary.
Taken together, they stood for the proposition that modernization was a positive good in and of itself. Both processes contributed to this image in the language they used and in the pressures they exerted. Accordingly, if modernization was desirable
in one area of competition law, it was assumed to be valuable in
related areas. This helps explain the momentum in each form
of modernization and how "success" or "progress" in one encouraged efforts in the other. Frequent discussion of the need
to modernize procedural aspects of competition law helped
open the door for change in substantive law. For many it became natural to ask not whether there should be fundamental
change in substantive law, but what that change should be. It
made modernization "fashionable" and thus provided support
and incentives for decision makers to move in that direction.
that those opposed to change
This, in turn, led to a perception
62
were, at best, "old-fashioned.
We can also discern more specific forms of interaction between the two forms of modernization. For example, procedural
modernization supported and encouraged substantive modernization by putting the process of change in motion. It performed
a kind of "icebreaker" function by decreasing initial resistance to
change and thus also making talk of change easier and more
easily acceptable.
It also created an institutional mechanism that announced
and repeatedly confirmed and emphasized the need for change.
It represented a specifically authorized process of institutional
reform and as such produced official texts, formally legitimated
procedures of modernization and legislative outcomes. This left
little room for complaints that the Commission was making important changes on its own and without legitimization, and thus
it tended to obscure the issue of legitimacy with regard to the
Commission's parallel efforts in regard to substantive modernization. Without this formal mechanism of procedural reform,
the Commission might have been on shakier political ground in
pushing for dramatic changes in substantive law.
As the process of procedural modernization proceeded, it
62. See, e.g., Brian Sher, The Last of the Steam-Powered Trains: ModernisingArticle 82,
25 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv 243, 243-46 (2004) (likening unreformed Article 82 of the
EC Treaty to the last of the old fashioned steam-powered trains).
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also demonstrated the relative ease with which the Commission
could overcome whatever resistance there might be to such
changes. At the outset of the process there was little basis for
assessing the potential resistance to modernization, and many
expected it to be significant.6" Yet the Commission's success in
achieving its objective in procedural modernization demonstrated that it was in a position to overcome whatever resistance
it was likely to encounter. This gave the Commission confidence
that it could make changes in the substantive area, and it increased the perception among others that such efforts were
likely to be successful, which, in turn, enhanced the expected
payoffs for those efforts.
The introduction of mandatory application of EU law in Article 3 of Council Regulation 1/2003 ("Article 3") represents an
even more specific means by which procedural modernization
provided support for substantive modernization. On one level,
this requirement is a procedural issue. It answers the question of
which law an institution must apply. Once this principle was accepted, however, it gave further impetus to substantive modernization, because it created a new criterion for evaluating Europe's
substantive law. It now became important for substantive law to
be capable of producing uniformity in language and outcomes
across a broad range of institutions, both national and European. This meant that the principles of competition law had to
be both appropriate for consistent application by this set of institutions and abstract enough to be efficiently communicated and
thus "shared."
The newly crafted criteria increased the perceived need for
consistency in the application of competition law and thus provided a strong impetus for substantive law change. The need for
uniformity was a primary justification for procedural modernization, especially the inclusion of Article 3: the same rules on competition should apply throughout the EU. Given that the Commission and its supporters pushed hard for this in the procedural modernization process, they were impelled to create
substantive principles that were likely to make it effective. This
subtly transformed procedural issues into substantive issues. In
63. See, Forrester, supra note 30, at 1028 (arguing that the new system will lead to
forum shopping, inconsistent application of the law, and difficulty in acquiring a definitive, central ruling from the Commission).
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order to achieve consistency, the many institutions that would be
applying Community competition law would need not only the
same procedures applying the same general legal principles, but
they would also need the same analytical principles for giving
content to competition law's often vague concepts. Having the
same rules would not be enough, unless the decision makers also
applied the substantive methods in giving content to these laws
and in applying them.
These considerations made a more economics-oriented approach particularly attractive. Neo-classical economics provides
a consistent methodology and a language that is used and applied by most economists throughout the world. This coherent
package thus represented an intellectual framework for achieving consistency. Moreover, this methodology and language can
be shared effectively at two levels. Basic principles of "efficiency"
and "consumer welfare" are readily shared by non-specialists,
and the more sophisticated aspects of the intellectual framework
are readily shared throughout an internationalized economics
profession."64

While procedural modernization helped to foster substantive change, substantive law changes also supported procedural
change. In particular, the introduction of mandatory application of EU substantive law reveals ways in which the processes are
intertwined and mutually reinforcing. If economics is to provide
the basic methodology for applying competition law, and if an
important justification for assigning it this role is that it provides
consistency in application of the rules, then it calls for institutional arrangements that can deliver this consistency. This, in
turn, calls for a high degree of organization among the decision
makers as well as mechanisms for sharing information among
them. In order for such an organization to function effectively,
a higher level of centralization is also necessary in order to coordinate information flows and decisional systems and thus minimize divergent applications. In the context of enlargement, this
was especially attractive, because many were concerned about
the capacity of new Member States to understand and apply the
more judicially framed and case-based methodology that had
been developed in competition law. These factors together sup64. See A.W. Coats, Conclusion to
NOMICS 395-99 (A.W. Coats ed., 1996).
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ported the Commission's request for an institutional and procedural structure that would enable the Commission to control
both information flows and administrative decisions. The European Competition Network ("ECN") was created in response to
these perceived needs.
In addition to these reciprocal reinforcement effects,
shared influences have knitted together the two processes.
"Shared influences" here refers to factors that have influenced
both processes. Where decisional influences are shared, the increased strength of a factor in one domain tends to increase its
influences in the other, and vice versa.
One important shared influence has been U.S. antitrust law.
Both European modernization processes have been influenced
by U.S. antitrust law and have moved European competition
closer to U.S. law.65 Procedural modernization has created an
institutional framework for competition law in Europe that is far
closer to U.S. law than the previous procedural mechanism was.
For example, by eliminating the notification requirement of
Regulation 17 that had played such a major role in competition
law, the procedural mechanism of European competition law acquired the same basic form as that in the United States. Similarly, in making EU law generally applicable throughout Europe,
except where conduct is essentially local, the modernization process created a distribution of powers in Europe that looks much
more like U.S. law. Finally, the changes have been accompanied
by efforts to increase private enforcement, again bringing the
system into closer conformity with the situation in the United
States.
In the substantive area, convergence between the two systems may be even more extensive and profound. Substantive
modernization has gradually moved European Community law
toward what can be seen as an American "model". In most areas
it has largely abandoned the multi-faceted, case-based analysis of
competition law issues in favor of an efficiency-based model that
in most substantive law areas differs little in its goals and methods from U.S. antitrust law.
This movement toward a more American-style competition
law in Europe has sometimes been explicitly intended, while at
65. See, e.g., Margaret Bloom, The U.S. and EU Move Towards Substantial Antitrust
Convergence on Consumer Welfare Based Enforcement, 19 ANTITRusT BULL. 18, 19 (2005).
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other times it has been only indirectly indicated. At one level, it
represents a response to U.S. experience. For example, elimination of the notification requirement was frequently justified by
reference to the fact that U.S. antitrust law operates quite effectively without the need for a notification system. More generally,
the move has taken place in a context in which U.S. economic
"successes" since the early 1990s have been seen as a challenge to
European policy makers, who have sought to "catch up" to U.S.
competitiveness. These successes conferred a kind of "model"
role on U.S. legal policies.
On another level, this model role is based on confidence in
its intellectual foundations. Key decision makers in the Commission increasingly have found the logic and policy claims used in
the U.S. system to be persuasive. The economic orientation of
the U.S. model has been seen as cogent, convincing and intellectually sound, and thus it has encouraged emulation.6 6
Finally, the geo-political situation has fostered a model role
for U.S. antitrust and encouraged emulation of the U.S. system.
One element of this situation is the power of U.S. institutionsboth public and private. U.S. antitrust authorities play central
roles in the discussion of international issues, and they have
been supported by the significant resources and political weight
of the U.S. government. They have generally pushed hard for
adoption of U.S. characteristics in European competition law. A
second, and related, element is the desire to avoid legal clashes
between U.S. antitrust law and European competition law such
as occurred, for example, in the GE/Honeywell case mentioned
above. Finally, the impetus to move toward a U.S. substantive
law model has been justified on the grounds that economic
globalization requires some common model on which the EU,
the United States and other countries can converge, and that if
there is to be such a model, it would have to be the U.S. model.6 7
The two processes shared not only a common "model," but
also a common opponent, namely, a group we can call the "tra66. See, e.g., Mario Monti, European Comm'r for Competition, Comments to the
Speech of Hew Pate: Antitrust in a Transatlantic Context, Brussels, Belg. (Jun. 7, 2004)
("[W]e have a great debt to the United States in helping us to forge our developments,
including very recent ones, in antitrust policy and enforcement.").
67. See DavidJ. Gerber, United States of America, in LIMITS AND CONTROL OF COMPETITION WITH A VIEW TO INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION 411, 446-47 (Juergen Basedow
ed., 2002).
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ditionalists." Resistance to both forms of modernization came
from basically the same sources, and Germany was particularly
prominent in this resistance.68 German officials and scholars
generally and often energetically opposed procedural modernization, and in so doing they became a target for the Commission
and its supporters. As the Commission's substantive agenda became clear, German officials and scholars also tended to be
among the most prominent critics of aspects of that agenda.
This naturally increased incentives for supporters of both forms
of modernization to attack the German positions and German
thinking in these areas. "Sharing" the same opponent provided
mutual support among both groups of modernizers and helped
to link their efforts.
In addition to sharing models and opponents, procedural
and substantive modernization also shared legitimacy claims.
The Commission had well-defined legal and political authority
to pursue procedural modernization, which included the need
to achieve the assent of the Member States and which provided
formal opportunities to contest the Commission's plans. With
regard to its substantive agenda, however, the situation has been
less clear. The Commission is authorized to interpret the Treaty
as it wishes, provided, however, that it remains within interpretations sanctioned by Community courts. There is at least some
question as to whether the Commission's changes in the fundamental goals and principles of competition law are consistent
with its obligations to remain within interpretations sanctioned
by the courts. Moreover, again unlike its procedural agenda, the
Commission's substantive agenda is not generally subject to effective contest by other organs of EU governance such as the
Council or the European Parliament. For the Commission to
make fundamental changes in the interpretation of competition
law may, therefore, at least test the limits of legitimacy. In the
specific case of Article 82, pursuit of that agenda may require a
change in the governing treaty provisions, and this would provide a formal framework for contesting that legitimacy.
Given that the Commission was pursuing both processes simultaneously, the Commission's heightened power and success
68. See Buxbaum, supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining that Germany's well developed competition law system would lose much of its role and importance because of modernization).
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in procedural modernization tended to support the legitimacy
of its efforts in substantive modernization. This effect was enhanced by the fact that both the groups and interests supporting
the Commission and those opposed to some of its plans were
either identical or overlapped significantly. The two processes
have thus "shared" legitimacy in the sense that the legitimacy of
pursuing one set of goals (procedural) has supported the pursuit of another set of goals.
Finally, the two processes have been linked by the development and consolidation of the TCL Group, which has been
strengthened by each and which has, in turn, supported each.
This group has supported both procedural and substantive modernization. This has allowed the pooling of interests and energies among group members and provided a means for mobilizing support for each project. It has concentrated efforts and established a shared incentive structure that has tended to focus
the deployment of resources within the group.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown some of the ways in which procedural and substantive modernization have become intertwined. It
has identified some of the ways in which each has conditioned
the other and shown that neither is fully understandable without
perceiving its relationship to the other.
Recognizing this interaction yields valuable insights and
frames potentially important questions regarding the role of
competition law in European integration and about the current
dynamics of the integration process itself. For example, it raises
issues about how to interpret and assess each of the modernization processes. If, as the analysis here shows, procedural modernization has supported and facilitated substantive law changes,
this needs to be taken into account in assessing the strength of
support for those substantive changes. It has become common
for supporters of the "more economic approach" to portray an
efficiency-based interpretation of EU competition law as a set of
ideas that has swept to quick and total acceptance within Europe. Yet this interpretation of the past few years may overstate
the case when one considers the derivative nature of at least
some support for that process. This is particularly significant,
because it may lead to questions about the degree to which na-
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tional judges, who are not subject to the pressures involved in
these processes, can be expected to follow the substantive
changes proposed by the Commission.6 9
This analysis becomes all the more useful when the political
and economic dimensions of the two processes are taken into
account. Procedural modernization has focused largely on matters that have limited interest for the general public and for
most governments and businesses. On the other hand, substantive modernization impacts the very process of European integration itself and touches fundamental issues in economic and
political life. Therefore, to the extent that support for substantive modernization has derived from the process of procedural
modernization, a Commission project with low public policy valence has supported and legitimated a set of changes with significantly higher public policy importance.
Relating the two modernization processes also sheds light
on the dynamics of each and on the role and power of institutions and groups involved. For example, it reveals additional aspects of the so-called "democracy deficit" issue in Europe-i.e.,
the issue of how much power officials should have who are
neither elected nor subject to effective control by those who are
elected. 0 Viewing the two modernization processes together
highlights the extent and nature of the Commission's power.
The Commission has been able to change fundamentally both
substance and procedure in European competition law with
minimal effective input from many of those affected by those
changes. 7" This may be desirable, but the importance of competition law to the European economy and the process of economic integration calls for recognition of the dynamics behind
such decisions.
Finally, analyzing the relationships here allows us to more
69. See Mario Siragusa, A Critical Review of the White Paper on the Reform of the EC
Competition Law Enforcement Rules, 23 FoRDtAm IT'L L.J. 1089, 1100 (2000) (arguing
that national courts will inconsistently apply Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty).
70. For discussions regarding the European Union's democracy deficit, see Martin
Nettesheim, Developing a Theory of Democracy for the European Union, 23 BERKELEYJ. INT'L
L. 358, 361 (2005); Stephen C. Sieberson, The ProposedEuropean Union Constitution- Will
it Eliminate the EU's Democratic Deficit?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173 (2004).
71. See Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 628 (1999)
(explaining that the European Community has not established legitimate democratic
hierarchal supervision over its supranational entities).
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clearly identify who has benefited from this double helix process. The European Commission has augmented its power in
important ways. The procedural modernization process has put
it in effective control of most significant competition law issues
throughout Europe. The requirement that EU competition law
be applied to virtually all potential competition-threatening conduct has dramatically reduced the independent role of national
competition laws and national competition authorities. The
Commission has become the control instance for this entire
body of law by virtue of its control of the ECN and the control of
national authorities that results from the ECN structure.
Substantive modernization has augmented this consolidation of the Commission's power because it creates a single methodology for determining and applying competition law that is to
a large extent controlled by the Commission. In essence, it requires all decision makers to apply conduct standards according
to principles established by the Commission. The national
courts are not subject to the Commission's control, of course,
but they will be subject to significant pressure to apply the rules
and principles established by the Commission and applied by all
national competition authorities. The use of economics represents in this context a lever of control and a means of increasing
the institutional influence of the Commission.
The intertwined modernization processes have also benefited other groups. Economists, for example, have been major
"winners" in the process. It is their language and methodology
that has been introduced in the substantive modernization process and anchored by the procedural modernization process.
This has dramatically increased the role and importance of economists within the European competition law system and, accordingly, augmented the market value of economists' services.
Since economists typically provide these services through consultancy firms, it has also enhanced the role of these firms.
The changes have similarly benefited U.S. law firms (and
European lawyers associated with U.S. firms). As EU competition law has moved closer to a U.S.-style system, the value of
knowledge about how to operate within such a system is correspondingly increased. U.S. lawyers know how to operate in a system in which economics plays the roles it is increasingly being
asked to play in Europe, and they have "first mover" advantages
in using economics-based knowledge in the competition law con-
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text. They can, in effect, "sell" those advantages in Europe. This
also, in turn, contributes to the consolidation of law firms within
Europe, as large firms with U.S. style structures and experience
provide services that are more difficult and costly for traditional
European legal practitioners to provide.
It is important to identify the incentive structure of these
groups and institutions. This is not because their interests might
be inconsistent with the public's interest in effective application
and development of competition law. The assumption should
be that the public officials involved do operate in what they consider the public interest. I know of no serious observers who
would doubt that proposition. Rather, the objective of this analysis is to identify the dynamics of change in European competition law, and these incentive sets are part of that analysis.
The analysis here has examined the relationship between
processes of change in the area of competition law. It has revealed some of the factors involved in these processes, but certainly not all. The objective has been to identify the interactions
between these two processes and point to some of the ways in
which such an analysis may be beneficial. The relevance of the
analysis goes well beyond competition law, because the factors
we have identified here can influence the future course of European integration.

